

# Suggestions for Enhancing Private Insurer Participation and Competition in Coastal Alabama Property Insurance Markets

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


# The Dollars and Cents of Alabama's Coastal Exposure

## Exposure is Sizable but Better Managed than in Most States

# Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure in 2007\*


#### (\$ Billions)



\*Latest available.


Source: AIR Worldwide

### Insured Coastal Exposure as a Percentage of Statewide Insured Exposure, 2007



# Value of Insured Residential Coastal Exposure in 2007


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# Value of Insured Commercial Coastal Exposure, 2007


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
# Beach/Hybrid Plan Exposure as a Share of Total Coastal Exposure





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
## **Population Density in Alabama**



Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from U.S. Census Bureau data; Insurance Information Institute.

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### Alabama Coastal Development vs. Noncoastal Development




Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from U.S. Census Bureau data; Insurance Information Institute.

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### Alabama: Value of Insured Coastal Exposure, 1980 - 2007


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508% Growth from 1980 to 2007, Average Annual Growth 6.9%




Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from AIR; IRC Coastal Exposure and Community Protection; Insurance Information Institute.

#### 793% Growth From 1990 to 2007, Average Annual Growth 16.85%



Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from PIPSO data; Insurance Information Institute.

### Alabama's Plan Exposure as a Share of Total State Exposure, 2004 vs. 2007




Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from PIPSO, NCIUA, AIR data; Insurance Information Institute.

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# Alabama's Plan Exposure as a Share of Total Coastal Exposure, 2004 vs. 2007





Source: Insurance Research Council, State Beach and Windstorm Plans: An Overview of Operations and Financial Structures, Sept. 2010 from PIPSO, NCIUA, AIR data; Insurance Information Institute.



# So What Can We Say About Alabama's Coastal Exposure Problem?

## **Summary of Alabama's Coastal Issue**



#### Population Growth: Faster in Coastal Counties for Past 60 Years (2x)

Coastal Development: Permitting as Much as 10x Higher

#### But Situation is Much Better than Most Other States

- Only 2 coastal counties have direct coastal exposure
- Plan limits sale of policies to these 2 counties (Baldwin, Mobile)

#### Alabama's Herfindahl-Hirshman Index Value in 2009 = 1348

- Interpretation: State is "moderately concentrated"
- It is not much higher than many noncoastal states (TN = 1318, KY = 1298)

#### Factors Helping Alabama

- Plan covers the state's 2 coastal counties only
- Risk sharing through the use of deductibles
- Incentives to build to stronger standards



# Are Coastal Development Plans Rational?

## For Individual Decision Makers: Yes For Society as a Whole: No

#### Excessive Catastrophe Exposure: Outcome of Economically & Politically Rational Decision Process?



#### Property Owners

- Make economically rational decision to live in disaster-prone areas
- Low cost of living, low real estate prices & rapid appreciation, low/no income tax, low property tax, rapid job growth
- Government-run insurers (e.g., CPIC, NFIP) provide implicit subsidies by selling insurance at below-market prices with few underwriting restrictions
- Government aid, tax deductions, litigation recovery for uninsured losses
- No fear of death and injury

#### Local Zoning/Permitting Authorities

- Allowing development is economically & politically rational & fiscally sound
- Residential construction creates jobs, attracts wealth, increases tax receipts, stimulates commercial construction & permanent jobs, develops infrastructure
- Increases local representation in state legislature & political influence
- Property and infrastructure damage costs shifted to others (state and federal taxpayers, policyholders in unaffected areas)

#### Developers

- Coastal development is a high-margin business
- Financial interest reduced to zero after sale

#### Excessive Catastrophe Exposure: Outcome of Economically & Politically Rational Decision Process?



#### State Legislators

- Loathe to pass laws negatively impacting development in home districts
- Local development benefits local economy and enhances political influence
- Rapid development lessens need for higher income and property taxes
- Can redistribute CAT losses to unaffected policyholders and taxpayers
- Can suppress insurance prices via state insurance regulator, suppress pricing and weaken underwriting standards in state-run insurer & redistribute losses

#### Congressional Delegation

- Home state development increases influence in Washington
  - Political representation, share of federal expenditures
- Loathe to pass laws harming development in home state/district
- Tax law promotes homeownership and actually produces supplemental benefits for property owners in disaster-prone areas
- Large amounts of unbudgeted disaster aid easily authorized
- Tax burden largely borne by those outside CAT zone & those with no representation (children & unborn)

#### • President

- Presidential disaster declarations and associated aid are increasing
- Political benefits to making declarations and distributing large amounts of aid
- Direct impact on favorability ratings & election outcomes
- Losses can be distributed to other areas and the unrepresented

Source: Insurance Information Institute.



# How Insurers Signal What Should Be Built and Where

## **Price as a Messenger of Risk**

## Government-Run Insurers Lead to Poor Land Use/Design Decisions



- Government-run insurers (markets of last resort) serve as a vital safety valve after major market disruptions, but also serve as an enabler of unwise development...
- Government-run property insurers wash away market-based signals about relative risk
- Consequence is runaway development in disaster-prone areas
- Government-run insurers:
  - Generally fail to charge actuarially sound rates
  - Have weak underwriting standards
  - Are thinly capitalized
  - Can assess losses to policyholders other than their own
  - Vulnerable to political pressure
- Inadequate premiums, insufficient capital and weak underwriting mean that most government plans, from Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to the National Flood Insurance Program operate with frequent deficits

# Negative Outcomes from Flaws in Government-Run Insurers



- True risk associated with building on a particular piece of property is obscured
- Subsidies are generated leading to market distortions/inequities:
  - Many thousands of homes likely would not have been built (or built differently) if property owner obligated to pay actuarially sound rates
  - CPIC assessments from Wilma will require grandmothers living in trailer parks on fixed incomes in Gainesville to subsidize million dollar homes in Marco Island via assessment (surcharges).
- Serial rebuilding in disaster-prone areas is the norm
- Property owners come to assume that the government rate is the "fair" rate and object to moves to actuarially sound rates.
- Government-run insurer can't control its own exposure
  - Legislature mandates that CPIC offer coverage in most cases if no private insurer will offer coverage due to high risk, near certainty of destruction
  - No restrictions on value of property, so high-valued properties represent disproportionate share of potential loss
- Taxpayer Burden: NFIP borrowed \$20B+ in 2005



## What Works, What Doesn't

## History, Past Actions Provide Lessons


## Successful Tools for Controlling Hurricane Exposure



- Strengthened building codes
- Stringent enforcement of building codes
- Fortified home programs
- Insurance rates based on sound actuarial principles (risk-based rates that are not government controlled); Works for commercial insurers
- Disciplined underwriting
- Removing impediments to capital flows
- Lowering insurers' cost of capital (e.g., pre-tax reserving)
- Incentives to adopt mitigation
- Forcing communities to consider and take a larger stake in their catastrophe exposure Source: Insurance Information Institute



#### **Return on Each \$1 Invested in Mitigation**



\*According to the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council of the National Institute of Building Science. Source: Institute for Business and Homes Safety; Insurance Information Institute.

### Unsuccessful Tools for Controlling Hurricane Exposure



- Insurance rates that are not actuarially sound (i.e., don't reflect true risk)
- Political interference in rate process
- Inadequate underwriting controls
- Subsidies
  - Intra-state (policyholders/taxpayers)
  - US Taxpayer
- Voluntary flood coverage
- Litigation

- Local control of land use and permitting creates significant incentive problems
  - Benefits accrue locally while many costs can be redistributed to others via taxes, insurance and aid
- Prospect of government aid reinforces unsound building and location decisions
- States don't want to raise taxes to pay for mitigation/prevention even if state is sole beneficiary
  - E.g., NO levees; Beach replenishment



## Recommendations

## **Toward a Long-Term Solution**

### Recommendations for Controlling Hurricane Exposure

- Raise public awareness of risk
  - Mandatory risk disclosure in all residential real estate transactions
  - Require signed waivers if decline flood coverage that also waive rights to any and all disaster aid, or
  - Mandate flood coverage

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- Continue to strengthen & enforce of building codes
- Allow markets to determine all property insurance rates
  - Role of state focused on difficult-to-insure or income issues
- Increase incentives to mitigate
- Require state-run insurer to charge actuarially sound rates and limit high value exposure
- Require communities/counties to a financial stake in their catastrophe exposure
  - Reimburse disaster aid to state/federal government



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