

# Who's Boring Now? Insurers Set the Financial Services Pace

## *Trends & Challenges Amid the Economic Storm*

**Auto Insurance Report National Conference  
2009 National Conference  
Naples, FL**



**April 28, 2009**

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# *Presentation Outline*

- **Financial Crisis & The Weakening Economy**
  - Economic & Labor Market Trends
- **Aftershock: P/C Insurance *After* the Financial Crisis**
- **10 Key Threats and Issues Facing P/C Insurers Through 2015**
- **Green Shoots: Signs of Recovery?**
- **Financial Strength & Ratings**
- **P/C Insurance Industry Overview & Outlook**
  - Profitability
  - Premium Growth
  - Underwriting Performance
  - Financial Market Impacts
- **Capital & Capacity**
- **Personal Lines Overview**

**Q & A**

# THE ECONOMIC STORM

*What the Financial Crisis and  
Deep Recession Mean for the  
P/C Insurance Industry*




**Exposure & Claim  
Cost Effects**

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# Real GDP Growth\*



\*Yellow bars are Estimates/Forecasts from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.

Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators 4/09; Insurance Information Institute.





# *GDP Growth: Advanced & Emerging Economies vs. World*


**1970-2010F**

The world economy is forecast to grow by 0.5% in 2009, but could shrink for the first time since WW II —by 1% to 2% according to the World Bank.

Emerging economies (led by China) are expected to grow by 3.3% in 2009


Advanced economies will shrink by 1.9% in 2009





# Real GDP Growth vs. Real P/C


## Premium Growth: Modest Association





# Length of US Recessions, 1929-Present\*

## Months in Duration



\* As of May 2009, inclusive

Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research; Insurance Information Institute.



# *Length of U.S. Business Cycles, 1929-Present\**


Duration (Months)

■ Contraction ■ Expansion Following

Average Duration\*\*

**Recession = 10.4 Months**

**Expansion = 60.5 Months**




\* As of May 2009, inclusive; \*\*Post-WW II period through end of most recent expansion.

Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research; Insurance Information Institute.






# *Annual Inflation Rates (CPI-U, %), 1990-2010F*





# *Total Industrial Production, (2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)*



# Labor Market Trends


**Fast & Furious: Massive Job Losses  
Sap the Economy and Workers  
Comp Exposure**





# *Unemployment Rate: On the Rise*


**January 2000 through March 2009**





# *US Unemployment Rate: A Volatile History (update)*


**January 1948 through February 2009**







# *U.S. Unemployment Rate, (2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)\**




\* Blue bars are actual; Yellow bars are forecasts

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (4/09); Insurance Info. Inst.




# Monthly Change Employment\* (Thousands)





# *Years With Job Losses: 1939-2009\**

## *(Thousands)*



**The US has  
seen net job  
losses in only  
16 of the 70  
years since  
1939**

**2008's job losses even  
exceeded those in 1945, at  
the conclusion of WW II**

**Losses through March  
2009 already rank the  
year as the 6<sup>th</sup> worst in  
the post WW II era**


\*Through March 2009.

Source: Insurance Information Institute research from

US Bureau of Labor Statistics data: <http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm>.




# State Construction Employment, Dec. 2007 – Dec. 2008



# Crisis-Driven Exposure Implications

*Auto, Home Exposure  
Growth Slows as  
Sales Nosedive*








# *Auto/Light Truck Sales, 1999-2010F (Millions of Units)*

**Weakening economy, credit  
crunch are hurting auto sales;  
Gas prices less of a factor now.**

**New auto/light truck sales  
are expected to experience a  
net drop of 6.7 million units  
annually by 2009 compared  
with 2005, a decline of  
39.6% and the lowest level  
since the late 1960s**



**Impacts of falling auto sales will  
have a less pronounced effect on  
auto insurance exposure growth  
than problems in the housing  
market will on home insurers**




# *New Private Housing Starts, 1990-2010F (Millions of Units)*

**Exposure growth forecast for HO  
insurers is dim for 2009 with some  
improvement in 2010.**


**Impacts also for comml. insurers  
with construction risk exposure**

**New home starts  
plunged 34%  
from 2005-2007;  
Drop through  
2009 is 73%  
(est.)—a net  
annual decline of  
1.51 million  
units, lowest  
since record  
began in 1959**



# Crisis Implications

*Top Crisis-Driven Claim  
Issues for Personal Lines  
Insurers*






# *Summary of Short-Run Impacts of Stimulus Package on P/C Insurance*

- **CLAIMING BEHAVIOR**
  - Claim frequency falls with miles driven. History: Drop is temporary.
  - Claim severity continues to rise: med costs, collisions repair costs up
  - Likely maintenance on homes, cars deferred → claim. freq/sev. impact?
- **PURCHASING BEHAVIOR: Efforts to Economize**
  - More shopping around
  - Increased deductibles
  - Dropping optional coverages (collision, comprehensive)
  - Lower limits
  - Insuring fewer vehicles (3 or 4<sup>th</sup> vehicle sold)
  - Insuring older vehicles (old cars retained, new car purchases deferred)
- **UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST % RISES**
  - Expected to rise from 13.8% in 2007 to 16.1% in 2010
- **FRAUD & ABUSE:**
  - Evidence emerging of increased frequency of “give-ups” where car owners underwater on payments commit fraud to obtain insurance money (e.g., car arson, fabricated theft, etc.)
  - Anecdotal evidence of owner-caused home arson



# *Percentage Motorists Driving Without Insurance, 2003-2010F*








# Do Changes in Miles Driven Affect Auto Collision Claim Frequency?

Paid Claim Frequency = (No. of paid claims)/(Earned Car Years) x 100



Sources: Federal Highway Administration (<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tvtw/08septvt/index.cfm>;  
ISO Fast Track Monitoring System, *Private Passenger Automobile Fast Track Data: Nine Months 2008*,  
published April 1, 2009 and earlier reports. \*2008 ISO figure is for 4 quarters ending Q4 2008.



# Auto Insurance: Claim Frequency Impacts of Energy Crisis of 1973/4

**Oct. 17,  
1973: Arab  
oil embargo  
begins**

## **Frequency Impacts**

**Collision: -7.7%**

**PD: -9.5%**

**BI: -13.3%**

## **Driving Stats**

**Gas prices rose  
35-40%**

**Miles driven fell  
6.7% in 1974**


**March 17,  
1974: Arab  
oil states  
announce  
end to  
embargo**

**Frequency  
began to  
rebound  
almost  
immediately  
after the  
embargo  
ended**


Figure 6

## ***The First Crisis—Frequency***


### ***Collision***



### ***Property Damage\****



### ***Bodily Injury\*\****




\*Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly Paid Fast Track data indexed to First Quarter 1973.

\*\*ISO Paid Data, year-ended quarter indexed to First Quarter 1973.

# GREEN SHOOTS

*Is the Recession  
Nearing an End?*





# *Hopeful Signs That the Economy Will Begin to Recover Soon*

- **Recession Appears to be Bottoming Out, Freefall Has Ended**
  - Pace of GDP shrinkage is beginning to diminish
  - Pace of job losses is leveling off
  - Major stock market indices well off record lows, anticipating recovery
  - Some signs of retail sales stabilization are evident
- **Financial Sector is Stabilizing**
  - Banks are reporting quarterly profits
  - Many banks expanding lending to credit worthy people & businesses
- **Housing Sector Likely to Find Bottom Soon**
  - Home are much more affordable (attracting buyers)
  - Mortgage rates are at multi-decade lows (attracting buyers)
  - Freefall in housing starts and existing home sales is ending
- **Inflation & Energy Prices Are Under Control**
- **Consumer & Business Debt Loads Are Shrinking**

# AFTERSHOCK

**What Will the P/C  
Insurance Industry Look  
Like After the Crisis?**

**iii** *6 Key Differences*

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# *6 Key Differences: P/C Insurance in the Post-Financial Catastrophe World*

- 1. The P/C Insurance Industry Will Be Smaller: The Industry Will Have Shrunk by About 3% in Dollar Terms and by 8% on an Inflation Adjusted Basis, 2007-09**
  - Falling prices, weak exposure growth, increasing government intervention in private (re)insurance markets, large retentions and alternative forms of risk transfer have siphoned away premium
  - There will be fewer competitors after a mini consolidation wave
- 2. P/C Industry Will Emerge With Its Risk Mgmt. Model More Intact than Most other Financial Service Segments**
  - Benefits of risk-based underwriting, pricing and low leverage clear
- 3. There Will Be Federal Regulation of Insurers: Now in Waning Months of Pure State-Based Regulation**
  - Federal regulation of “systemically important” firms seems certain
  - Solvency and Rates regulation, Consumer Protection may be shared
  - Dual regulation likely; federal/state regulatory conflicts are likely
  - With the federal nose under the tent, anything is possible

# *6 Key Differences: P/C Insurance in the Post-Financial Catastrophe World*

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4. **Investment Earnings Will Shrink Dramatically for an Extended Period of Time: Federal Reserve Policy, Shrinking Dividends, Aversion to Stocks**
  - Trajectory toward lower investment earnings is being locked in
5. **Back to Basics: Insurers Return to Underwriting Roots: Extended Period of Low Investment Exert Pressure to Generate Underwriting Profits Since 1960s**
  - Chastened and “derisked” but facing the same (or higher) expected losses, insurers must work harder to match risk to price
6. **P/C Insurers: Profitable Before, During & After Crisis: Resiliency Once Again Proven**
  - Directly the result of industry’s risk management practices



# *Possible Regulatory Scenarios for P/C Insurers as of Year-End 2009*

- **Status Quo:** P/C Insurers Remain Entirely Under Regulatory Supervision of the States
  - Unlikely, but some segments of the industry might welcome this outcome above all others
- **Federal Regulation:** Everything is Regulated by Feds
  - Unlikely that states will be left totally in the cold
- **Optional Federal Charter (OFC):** Insurers Could Choose Between Federal and State Regulation
  - Unlikely to be implemented as envisioned for past several years by OFC supporters
- **Dual Regulation:** Federal Regulation Layer Above State
  - Feds assume solvency regulation, states retain rate/form regulation
- **Hybrid Regulation:** Feds Assume Regulation of Large Insurers at the Holding Company Level
- **Systemic Risk Regulator:** Feds Focus on Regulation of Systemic Risk Points in Financial Services Sector
  - What are these points for insurers? P/C vs. Life?

# 10 Key Threats Facing Insurers Amid Financial Crisis

*Challenges for the  
Next 5-8 Years*







# *Important Issues & Threats*

## *Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

### **1. Erosion of Capital**

- Losses are larger and occurring more rapidly than is commonly understood or presumed
- Surplus down 13%=\$66B since 9/30/07 peak; 12% (\$80B ) in 2008
- P/C policyholder surplus could be even more by year-end 2009
- Some insurers propped up results by reserve releases
- Decline in PHS of 1999-2002 was 15% over 3 years and was entirely made up and then some in 2003. Current decline is ~13% in 5 qtrs.
- During the opening years of the Great Depression (1929-1933) PHS fell 37%, Assets fell 28% and Net Written Premiums fell by 35%. It took until 1939-40 before these key measures returned to their 1929 peaks.
- **BOTTOM LINE:** Capital and assets could fall much farther and faster than many believe. It will take years to return to the 2007 peaks (likely until 2011 with a sharp hard market and 2015 without one)





# *Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

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## **2. Reloading Capital After “Capital Event”**

- Continued asset price erosion coupled with major “capital event” could lead to shortage of capital among *some* companies
- Possible Consequences: Insolvencies, forced mergers, calls for govt. aid, requests to relax capital requirements
- P/C insurers have come to assume that large amounts of capital can be raised quickly and cheaply after major events (post-9/11, Katrina).
  - *This assumption may be incorrect in the current environment*
- Cost of capital is *much* higher today, reflecting both scarcity & risk
- Implications: P/C (re)insurers need to protect capital today and develop detailed contingency plans to raise fresh capital & generate internally. Already a reality for some life insurers.



# *Important Issues & Threats*

## *Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

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### **3. Long-Term Loss of Investment Return**

- Low interest rates, risk aversion toward equities and many categories of fixed income securities lock in a multi-year trajectory toward ever lower investment gains
- Price bubble in Treasury securities keeps yields low
- Many insurers have not adjusted to this new investment paradigm of a sustained period of low investment gains
- *Regulators will not readily accept it; Many will reject it*
- **Implication 1:** Industry must be prepared to operate in environment with investment earnings accounting for a smaller fraction of profits
- **Implication 2:** Implies underwriting discipline of a magnitude not witnessed in this industry in more than 30 years. Yet to manifest itself.
- Lessons from the period 1920-1975 need to be relearned



# *Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

## **4. Economic Collapse**

- Long-term decline in industry growth prospects similar to the 1930s
- Collapse does *not* imply inability to remain profitable
- Industry in 1930s shrank but became profitable
- Some insurers will not survive due to combination of poor investment environment, operating underwriting challenges and capital depletion
- Policyholder and claimant behavior will change; *Need Mitigation Strategies*
  - Claim malingering
  - Cost shifting from healthcare into WC
  - Insurance fraud will increase (premium evasion, classification)
- **Bottom Line: Industry can survive deep and prolonged economic downturn, but not without casualties**



# *Important Issues & Threats*

## *Facing Insurers: 2009 – 2???*

### **5. Regulatory Overreach**

- Principle danger is that P/C insurers get swept into vast federal regulatory overhaul and subjected to inappropriate, duplicative and costly regulation (Dual Regulation)
- Danger is high as feds get their nose under the tent
- Status Quo is viewed as unacceptable by all
- Pushing for major change is not without significant risk in the current highly charged political environment
- Insurance & systemic risk
- Disunity within the insurance industry
- Impact of regulatory changes will be felt for decades
- **Bottom Line: Regulatory outcome is uncertain and risk of adverse outcome is high**





# *Important Issues & Threats*

## *Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

### **6. Creeping Restrictions on Underwriting**

- Attacks on underwriting criteria such as credit, education, occupation, territory increasing
- Industry will lose some battles
- View that use of numerous criteria are discriminatory and create an adverse impact on certain populations
- Impact will be to degrade the accuracy of rating systems to increase subsidies
- Predictive modeling also at risk
- Current social and economic environment could accelerate these efforts
- Danger that bans could be codified at federal level during regulatory overhaul
- **Bottom Line: Industry must be prepared to defend existing and new criteria indefinitely**





# *Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

## **7. Exploitation of Insurance as a Wealth Redistribution Mechanism**

- There is a longstanding history of attempts to use insurance to advance wealth redistribution/economic agendas
- Urban subsidies in auto; Coastal subsidies are old; Could be extended to workers comp in variety of ways
- Insurer focus on underwriting profitability (resulting in higher rates) coupled with poor economic conditions could raise profile of affordability issue
- Calls for “excess profits tax” on insurers
- Increased government involvement in insurance (including ownership stakes) make this more likely
- Federal regulation could impose such redistribution schemes
- **Bottom Line: Expect efforts to address social and economic inequities through insurance**

# *Important Issues & Threats*



## *Facing P/C Insurers: 2009 - 2015*

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### **8. Mega-Catastrophe Losses**

- **\$100B CAT year is not improbably over the next 5-7 year**
- **Severity trend remains upward**
- **Frequency trends highly variable but more prone to spikes**
- **FINANCING: Unclear if sufficient capital exists to finance mega-cats in current capital constrained environment**
- **Concern over reinsurance capacity and pricing**
- **Alternative sources of CAT financing have dried up**
- **Some regulators will continue to suppress rates**
- **Residual markets shares remain high**
- **Loss of volume for private insurers in key states (e.g., FL)**
- *Serves as entry point for socialization of insurance*
- **Bottom Line: Capacity to finance mega-cats is diminished. Government may fill the void, sometimes with the industry's support; sometimes in spite of opposition**



# *Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 -2015*

## **9. Creeping Socialization and Partial Nationalization of Insurance System**

- CAT risk is, on net, being socialized directly via state-run insurance and reinsurance mechanisms or via elaborate subsidy schemes involving assessments, premium tax credits, etc.
- Some (life) insurers seeking TARP money
- Efforts to expand flood program to include wind
- Health insurance may be substantively socialized
- Terrorism risk—already a major federal role backed by insurers
- Eventually impacts for other lines such as personal auto, WC?
- Feds may open to more socialization of private insurance risk
- Ownership stakes in some insurers could be a slippery slope
- States like FL will lean heavily on Washington in the event of a mega-cat that threatens state finance
- **Bottom Line: Additional socialization likely. Can insurers/will insurers draw the line?**



# *Important Issues & Threats Facing Insurers: 2009 -2015*

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
## **10. Emerging Tort Threat**

- No tort reform (or protection of recent reforms) is forthcoming from the current Congress or Administration
- Erosion of recent reforms is a certainty (already happening)
- Innumerable legislative initiatives will create opportunities to undermine existing reforms and develop new theories and channels of liability
- Torts twice the overall rate of inflation
- Influence personal and commercial lines, esp. auto liab.
- Historically extremely costly to p/c insurance industry
- Leads to reserve deficiency, rate pressure
- **Bottom Line: Tort “crisis” is on the horizon and will be recognized as such by 2012-2014**



# THE \$787 BILLION ECONOMIC STIMULUS

**Sectoral Impacts &  
Implications for P/C  
Insurance**







# *Summary of Short-Run Impacts of Stimulus Package on P/C Insurance*


- **No Stimulus Provisions Specifically Address P/C Insurance**
  - Spending, Aid and Tax Reductions benefit other industries, state and local governments, as well as individual and some corporate taxpayers
- **Stimulus Package is Unlikely to Increase Net Premiums Written by More Than 1% or Approx. \$4.5 Bill. by Year-End 2010**
- **“Direct” Impact to P/C Insurers Results Primarily from Increased Demand for Commercial Insurance**
  - Primarily the result of increased infrastructure spending and the resulting need to insure workers, property and protect against liability risks
  - Because the primary objective of the stimulus is employment related, workers compensation will be the p/c line that benefits the most
  - Assuming the target of 3.5 million jobs created or preserved is achieved, private workers comp NPW (new and preserved) could amount to as much as \$1.1 billion
  - Other commercial lines to benefit: surety, commercial auto, inland marine
- **Other “Direct” P/C Demand Benefits Will Be Minimal**
  - Tax provisions providing incentives to buy cars and homes and accelerate the depreciation of equipment will have little net impact on exposure
  - Some additional premium may be generated as older cars and equipment are replaced with new and more valuable (and therefore more expensive to insure)



# *Economic Stimulus Package: Where the \$787B Goes*

**Objective is to create or  
preserve 3.5 million jobs**

**\$ Billions**



**Tax relief and aid to  
state and local  
government account for  
56% of stimulus. Actual  
spending accounts for  
only about 25%**




# *Stimulus: Reading The Economic Tea Leaves for the Next 4 to 8 Years*

- **Growing Role of Government:** 2009 Stimulus Package and Other Likely Spending Initiatives Guarantee that Government Will Play a Much Larger Role Than at Any Other Time in Recent History
  - Every industry, including insurance, will and must attempt to maximize direct and indirect benefits from this paradigm shift
- **Obama Administration Priorities:** Stimulus Package Acts as “Economic Tea Leaf” on the Administration’s Fiscal Priorities for the Next Several Years
- **These Include:**
  - Alternative Energy
  - Health Care
  - Education
  - Aging/New Infrastructure
  - Aid to States
- **Stimulus is Only One Leg of the Stool**
  - (1) Stimulus; (2) Housing, and (3) Financial Services Reform

# FINANCIAL STRENGTH & RATINGS


**Industry Has Weathered  
the Storms Well**





# *P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2008*


The number of impairments varies significantly over the p/c insurance cycle, with peaks occurring well into hard markets







# *P/C Insurer Impairment Frequency vs. Combined Ratio, 1969-2008*






# *P/C Impairment Frequency vs. Catastrophe Points in Combined Ratio, 1977-2008*

Impairment rates are highly correlated with underwriting performance and reached record lows in 2007/08


■ Catastrophe Points in Combined Ratio  
◆ P/C Impairment Frequency



2008 impairment rate was a record low 0.23%, second only to the 0.17% record low in 2007 and barely one-fourth the 0.82% average since 1969



# *Number of Impairments by State, 1969-2008*






# *Frequency of Impairments by State, 1969-2008*

(Impairments per 100 Insurers Domiciled in State)

**WY, LA, FL have the highest impairment rates in the country**

**National average = 0.82%**






# Summary of A.M. Best's P/C Insurer Ratings Actions in 2008\*

P/C insurance is by design a resilient in business. The dual threat of financial disasters and catastrophic losses are anticipated in the industry's risk management strategy.

Despite financial market turmoil, high cat losses and a soft market in 2008, 81% of ratings actions by A.M. Best were affirmations; just 3.8% were downgrades and 4.0% upgrades



\*Through December 19.

Source: A.M. Best.








# Historical Ratings Distribution, US P/C Insurers, 2008 vs. 2005 and 2000

**2008**

**A++/A+ and  
A/A- gains**

**2005**


**2000**



**P/C insurer financial strength  
has improved since 2005  
despite financial crisis**




# *Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2008*



**Deficient loss reserves and inadequate pricing are the leading cause of insurer impairments, underscoring the importance of discipline. Investment catastrophe losses play a much smaller role.**

# **Critical Differences Between P/C Insurers and Banks**

**Superior Risk Management Model  
& Low Leverage Make  
a Big Difference**





# *How Insurance Industry Stability Has Benefitted Consumers*

## **BOTTOM LINE:**

- **Insurance Markets—Unlike Banking—Are Operating *Normally***
- **The Basic Function of Insurance—the Orderly Transfer of Risk from Client to Insurer—Continues *Uninterrupted***
- **This Means that Insurers Continue to:**
  - **Pay claims (whereas 50 banks have gone under as of 4/17)**
    - *The Promise is Being Fulfilled*
  - **Renew existing policies (banks are reducing and eliminating lines of credit)**
  - **Write new policies (banks are turning away people who want or need to borrow)**
  - **Develop new products (banks are scaling back the products they offer)**



# Reasons Why P/C Insurers Have Fewer Problems Than Banks:

## A Superior Risk Management Model

- **Emphasis on Underwriting**
  - Matching of risk to price (via experience and modeling)
  - Limiting of potential loss exposure
  - *Some banks sought to maximize volume and fees and disregarded risk*
- **Strong Relationship Between Underwriting and Risk Bearing**
  - **Insurers always maintain a stake in the business they underwrite, keeping “skin in the game” at all times**
  - *Banks and investment banks package up and securitize, severing the link between risk underwriting and risk bearing, with (predictably) disastrous consequences—straightforward moral hazard problem from Econ 101*
- **Low Leverage**
  - Insurers do not rely on borrowed money to underwrite insurance or pay claims → *There is no credit or liquidity crisis in the insurance industry*
- **Conservative Investment Philosophy**
  - High quality portfolio that is relatively less volatile and more liquid
- **Comprehensive Regulation of Insurance Operations**
  - The business of insurance remained comprehensively regulated whereas a separate banking system had evolved largely outside the auspices and understanding of regulators (e.g., hedge funds, private equity, complex securitized instruments, credit derivatives—CDS's)
- **Greater Transparency**
  - Insurance companies are an open book to regulators and the public




# The Financial Crisis in Perspective

**Bank vs. Insurer Impacts**



# *Financial Institutions Globally Facing Huge Losses from the Credit Crunch\**

Billions




\*Global losses since the beginning of 2007.

Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008, IIF, Bloomberg, cited in a presentation by Thomas Hess (Chief Economist, Swiss Re) October 23, 2008, accessed via Geneva Association web site.




# Top 10 Largest Bank Failures





# *US Bank Failures:\** *1995-2009\*\**

**Through April 17, 2009**




\*Includes all commercial banking and savings institutions. \*\*Through April 17.

Source: FDIC: <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/index.html>; Insurance Info. Institute



# *US Bank Failures:\** *1934-2009\*\**

**Through April 17, 2009**




\*Includes all commercial banking and savings institutions.

\*\*Data begin in 1934, the year the FDIC was established.

Source: FDIC: <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/index.html>; Insurance Info. Institute



# *Top 10 P/C Insolvencies, Based Upon Guaranty Fund Payments\**



\* Disclaimer: This is not a complete picture. If anything the numbers are understated as some states have not reported in certain years.

Source: National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds, as of September 17, 2008.

# **P/C INSURANCE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE**

**A Resilient Industry in  
 Challenging Times**

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
# Profitability

**Historically Volatile**





# *P/C Net Income After Taxes 1991-2008F (\$ Millions)\**




\*ROE figures are GAAP; <sup>1</sup>Return on avg. Surplus. Excluding Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers yields an 4.2% ROAS for 2008.

Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst.



# *P/C Insurance Industry ROEs, 1975 – 2009F\**



Note: 2008 result excluding Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers is 4.2%.


Sources: ISO; A.M. Best (2009F); Insurance Information Institute.





# *ROE vs. Equity Cost of Capital:*

## *US P/C Insurance: 1991-2008*




\*Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.  
Source: The Geneva Association, Ins. Information Inst.

—▲— ROE —■— Cost of Capital



# *A 100 Combined Ratio Isn't What it Used to Be: 95 is Where It's At*




\* 2008 figure is return on average statutory surplus. Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.

Source: Insurance Information Institute from A.M. Best and ISO data.


# Presidential Politics & P/C Insurance

*How is Profitability Affected by the  
President's Political Party?*





# *P/C Insurance Industry ROE by Presidential Administration, 1950-2008\**



**OVERALL RECORD:**  
**1950-2008\***

**Democrats 8.00%**

**Republicans 7.89%**

**Party of President has  
marginal bearing on  
profitability of P/C  
insurance industry**

\*Truman administration ROE of 6.97% based on 3 years only, 1950-52.

Source: Insurance Information Institute






# *P/C Insurance Industry ROE by Presidential Party Affiliation, 1950–2008\**

**BLUE** = Democratic President

**RED** = Republican President




Source: Insurance Information Institute. \*2008 based 9-month data.




# P/C Premium Growth

**Primarily Driven by the  
Industry's Underwriting  
Cycle, Not the Economy**






# *Strength of Recent Hard Markets by NWP Growth*





# *Year-to-Year Change in Net Written Premium, 2000-2009F\**




\*2008 figure is from ISO. Excluding Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers = -1.5%.  
Source: A.M. Best (historical and forecast)



# *Personal/Commercial Lines & Reinsurance NPW Growth, 2006-2009F*


**Declines in premium growth began to stabilize in later 2008 and are firming to some extent as we move into 2009, but are partly offset by flat/declining exposures due to the recession**





# Average Expenditures on Auto Insurance

*Countrywide auto insurance expenditures increased 2.5% in 2008, but still remain below 2004 levels*




\*Insurance Information Institute Estimates/Forecasts

Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute estimates 2007-2009 based on CPI data.





# Average Premium for Private Home Insurance Policies\*\*




\*Insurance Information Institute Estimates/Forecasts \*\*Excludes state-run insurers.

Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute estimates 2007-2009 based on CPI data.

# Capital/ Policyholder Surplus

Shrinkage, but  
Capital is Within  
Historic Norms






# *U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2008\**

**Actual capacity as of 12/31/08 was \$455.6, down 12.0% from 12/31/07 at \$517.9B, but still 60% above its 2002 trough. Recent peak was \$521.8 as of 9/30/07. Surplus as of 12/31/08 is 12.7% below 2007 peak.**


**The premium-to-surplus ratio stood at \$0.95:\$1 at year end 2008, up from near record low of \$0.85:\$1 at year-end 2007**

*“Surplus” is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to “Owners Equity” or “Net Worth” in non-insurance organizations*






# *Policyholder Surplus, 2006:Q4 – 2008:Q4*





# *Premium-to-Surplus Ratios Before Major Capital Events\**



\*Ratio is for end of quarter immediately prior to event. Date shown is end of quarter prior to event.


\*\*Latest available

Source: PCS; Insurance Information Institute.





# *Ratio of Insured Loss to Surplus for Largest Capital Events Since 1989\**




\*Ratio is for end-of-quarter surplus immediately prior to event. Date shown is end of quarter prior to event.

\*\*Latest available

Source: PCS; Insurance Information Institute.




# *U.S. P/C Industry Premiums-to-Surplus Ratio: 1985-2008*






# *Historically, Hard Markets Follow When Surplus “Growth” is Negative*





# *New Funds Contributing to US Policyholder Surplus, 2005-2008\**

**\$ Billions**




\*Through Q4 2008 (latest available).

Source: ISO; Insurance Information Institute

# Investment Performance

*Investments are the Principle  
Source of Declining  
Profitability*








# *Distribution of P/C Insurance Industry's Investment Portfolio*

**As of December 31, 2007**


## Portfolio Facts

- Invested assets totaled \$1.3 trillion as of 12/31/07
- Insurers are generally conservatively invested, with 2/3 of assets invested in bonds as of 12/31/07
- Only about 18% of assets were invested in common stock as of 12/31/07
- Even the most conservative of portfolios was hit hard in 2008





# *Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment Gain: 1994- 2008<sup>1</sup>*




<sup>1</sup>Investment gains consist primarily of interest, stock dividends and realized capital gains and losses. 2006 figure consists of \$52.3B net investment income and \$3.4B realized investment gain.

\*2005 figure includes special one-time dividend of \$3.2B.

Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.



# *P/C Insurer Net Realized Capital Gains, 1990-2008*




Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.



# *Total Returns for Large Company Stocks: 1970-2009\**

**S&P 500 is down 3.7% in 2009\***




Source: Ibbotson Associates, Insurance Information Institute.

\*Through April 17, 2009.



# *Treasury Bond Yields Have Generally Been Falling*




Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (history); Blue Chip Economic Indicators, February 2009 issue (forecasts)





# Treasury Yield Curves: Pre-Crisis vs. Current\*




\*March 2009.

Sources: Federal Reserve; Insurance Information Institute.




# *VIX Volatility Index: Stock Market Volatility at Record Highs in 2008\**



Sources: Chicago Board Options Exchange: <http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx>



# Stock Market Daily Volatility in 2008\*: Heading to “Normal”?



\*September 2 to December 31, 2008.

Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange: <http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx>


# Underwriting Trends

**Financial Crisis Does Not Directly  
Impact Underwriting  
Performance: Cycle, Catastrophes  
Were 2008's Drivers**





# *P/C Insurance Combined Ratio, 1970-2008F\**




Sources: A.M. Best; ISO, III \*Excluding mortgage & financial guarantee insurers in 2008 = 101.0.





# *P/C Insurance Industry Combined Ratio, 2001-2009E*




\*Includes Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers.

Sources: A.M. Best.



# *Underwriting Gain (Loss)*


## *1975-2008\**





# *Number of Years With Underwriting Profits by Decade, 1920s – 2000s*

## Number of Years with Underwriting Profits



Underwriting profits were common before the 1980s (40 of the 60 years before 1980 had combined ratios below 100)—but then they vanished. Not a single underwriting profit was recorded in the 25 years from 1979 through 2003.

Note: Data for 1920 – 1934 based on stock companies only.

Sources: Insurance Information Institute research from A.M. Best Data.

101

\*2000 through 2008.

# Personal Lines

**Auto (~75% of Market)**


**Home (~25%)**





# *Personal Lines*

## *Combined Ratio, 1993-2009F*




Source: A.M. Best (historical and forecast).






# Homeowners Insurance Combined Ratio






# *Private Passenger Auto (PPA) Combined Ratio*



Sources: A.M. Best (historical and forecasts)



# *Monthly Change in Auto Insurance Prices\**



\*Percentage change from same month in prior year.


Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

# Commercial Lines






# *Commercial Lines Combined Ratio, 1993-2009F*








# Average Commercial Rate Change, All Lines, (1Q:2004 – 1Q:2009)




# Catastrophe Losses

**Impacting Underwriting  
Results and the Bottom Line**



# *U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses\**



\*Excludes \$4B-\$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita.


\*\*Based on PCS data through Dec. 31. PCS \$2.1B loss of for Gustav. \$10.655B for Ike of 12/05/08.

**Note:** 2001 figure includes \$20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = \$12.2B.<sup>111</sup>

**Source:** Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute



# *States With Highest Insured Catastrophe Losses in 2008*





# *Top 12 Most Costly Disasters in US History, (Insured Losses, \$2007)*



\*PCS estimate as of 12/15/08.





# *Number of PCS Catastrophe Events, 1998-2008\**




\*PCS defines a catastrophe as an even that caused at least \$25 million in insured property damage and affects and significant number of policyholders and insurers.

Source: PCS; Insurance Information Institute



# *Share of Losses Paid by Reinsurers, by Disaster\**




**Reinsurance is playing an increasingly important role in the financing of mega-CATs**

\*Excludes losses paid by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, a FL-only windstorm reinsurer, which was established in 1994 *after* Hurricane Andrew. FHCF payments to insurers are estimated at \$3.85 billion for 2004 and \$4.5 billion for 2005. Ike share is an estimate as of 2/9/09.

Sources: Wharton Risk Center, Disaster Insurance Project; Insurance Information Institute.

# Number of U.S. Significant Natural Catastrophes\*, 1950 – 2008

\$1 billion economic loss and/or 50 fatalities





# *Insurance Information Institute On-Line*

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YOUR ATTENTION!***