

The Financial Crisis & the P/C Insurance Industry *Challenges Amid the Economic Storm*

**Excess Surplus Lines Claims Association
Scottsdale, AZ**



September 23, 2008

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
Presentation Outline

- **Federal Government Economic Bailout: *Plan Summary, Insurer Implications***
- **AIG's Loan from the Fed: *Structure of Agreement***
- **Regulatory Aftershock: The Coming Regulatory Tsunami in Financial Services**
- **Weakening Economy: *Insurance Impacts & Implications***
 - **Exposure Impacts: Commercial Insurance**
 - **Inflation Threat Looming for Insurers?**
- **Treasury "Blueprint" for Insurance Regulatory Modernization**
- **Profitability**
- **Underwriting Trends**
- **Excess & Surplus Market Trends**
- **Premium Growth**
- **Capacity/Capital**
- **Investment Overview**
- **Catastrophic Loss**
- **Shifting Legal Liability, Tort & Political Environment**

Q&A

Troubled Asset Relief Program (a.k.a. “The Bailout”)

Plan Details & Insurer Implications





Federal Government Financial Services Rescue Package

THE SOLUTION: A 5-POINT PLAN

- 1. Mortgage Debt Purchases: Up to \$700 billion in mortgage debt to purchased by Feds**
 - **Pricing: Debt Sold to Feds via Reverse Auction**
 - Reverse auction is one in which sellers bid lowest price it will accept from the government (i.e., rather a traditional auction in which the highest bid from buyer wins). Helps ensure that the Feds (taxpayer) does not overpay for questionable debt
 - Will be sold in \$10 billion increments
 - Amassed portfolios will be run by 5-10 outside asset managers in amounts ranging up to \$50 billion
- 2. Fannie/Freddie Will Increase Mortgage Buying**
 - Feds step-up buying MBS in open market

Federal Government Financial Services Rescue Package (cont'd)

3. Money Market Fund Stabilization: Commercial Paper Market Froze After Mass Redemptions and Lending Fears (“Breaking the Buck”)

- Treasury will establish a 1-year temporary guaranty program for the money-fund industry for deposits held as of Sept. 19.
- Will insure retail and institutional funds (but not those investing exclusively in municipal and government debt)
- Funds must pay a fee to participate in the program
- Program financed with as much as \$50 billion from the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund, which was created in 1934 for exchange rate stabilization
- The Federal Reserve will also essentially lend as much as \$230 billion to the industry, via banks, to be used against their illiquid asset-backed holdings

4. 10-Day Ban on Short-Selling 829 Financial Stocks




Federal Government Financial Services Rescue Package (cont'd)

5. Conversion of Last 2 Remaining Investment Banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) to Bank Holding Companies

- **Recognition that Wall Street as we have known it for decades is dead**
- **High leverage investment bank model no longer viable in current market environment**
- **New entities will be subject to stringent federal regulation in exchange for more access to federal dollars/liquidity facilities**
- **Capital and liquidity requirements will be greatly enhanced**
- **Reduced leverage means new entities will be less profitable**



*Leverage Ratios for Investment Banks and Traditional Banks**



*Based on data for last quarter reported (May or June 2008).

Source: "The Perils of Leverage," North Coast Investment Research, Sept. 15, 2008



How Does Leverage Work?

- **Example of Non-Leverage Transaction**

- Buy 1 share of stock for \$100
- Price of share rises to \$110
- RETURN = \$10 or 10%

- **Leveraged Transaction**

- Invest \$10 and borrow \$90
- Stock rises to \$110
- RETURN = \$10 *or 100%* (less borrowing costs)

Investment banks and others juiced their returns by making big, bad bets with (mostly) borrowed money on mortgage securities

- **This Pleasant Arithmetic Works Equally Unpleasantly in the Opposite Direction**

- **Declining asset values, seizing of credit markets made such borrowing impossible and the operating model of investment banks nonviable**

Government Rescue Package of AIG

Motivation & Structural Details





AIG Rescue Package by the Fed

- **AIG suffered a liquidity crisis due to large positions, mostly associated with Credit Default Swaps, related to mortgage debt through its AIG Financial Products division**
- **The losses at AIGFP brought AIG's holding company to the brink of bankruptcy by Sept. 16 (AIG has 71 divisions)**
 - **Efforts to create large credit pool via private banks failed**
- **AIG's separately regulated insurance subsidiaries were solvent at all times and met local capital requirements in all jurisdictions***
- **Federal Reserve Agreed to Lend AIG \$85 Billion to Prevent Bankruptcy**
 - **2-year term @ 850 bps over LIBOR (about 11 to 11.5%)**
 - **Fed gets 79.9% stake in AIG (temporary nationalization)**
 - **CEO Robert Willumstad replaced by former Allstate CEO Edward Liddy**
- **Proceeds from sale of non-core assets will be used to repay loan**
- **New CEO says most insurance divisions are "core"**




Rational for Federal Reserve's Rescue Package of AIG

- **“Too Big to Fail” Doctrine Applied to Insurance for First Time**
- **AIG is the Largest Insurer in the US and One of the Top 5 Globally: Internationally Disruptive**
 - **Disorderly unwinding of CDS positions (which guarantee large amounts of debt) would have had large negative consequences on already fragile credit markets**
- **Fear Was that Generally Healthy Insurance Operations Affecting Millions of People and Businesses Would Have to Be Sold at Fire Sale Prices**
- **Loan Allowed Time for an Orderly Sale of Assets and a Minimal Disruption on Credit Markets while also Protecting Policyholders**
- **New CEO says most insurance divisions are “core”**

Leading U.S. Writers of P/C Insurance By DWP, 2007 (\$ Billions)¹


Direct Written Premiums (DWP) \$ Billions



¹Before reinsurance transactions, excluding state funds.



Leading U.S. Writers of Life Insurance By DWP, 2007 (\$ Billions)¹



¹Premium and annuity totals, before reinsurance transactions, excluding state funds.

Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Annual Statement Database, via Highline Data LLC.

AFTERSHOCK: Regulatory Response Could Be Harsh


**All Financial Segments
Including Insurers
Will Be Impacted**





Incurring Liabilities of the Federal Government Due to Financial Crisis

\$ Billions



The Fed (and hence taxpayer) are now exposed to as much as \$1.015 trillion in new debt tied to the current financial crisis*

*As of September 22, 2008. Amounts reflect maximum losses under terms at time of announcement. Source: Wall Street Journal, 9/22/08, p. A8; Insurance Information Institute research.

Liquidity Enhancements



Implemented by Fed Due to Crisis

- **Lowered Interest Rates for Direct Loans to Banks**
 - Federal funds rate cut from 5.5% in mid-2007 to 2.0% now
- **Injected Funds Into Money Markets**
- **Coordinated Exchange Transactions w/Foreign Central Banks**
- **Created New Auction and Other Lending Programs for Banks**
- **Started Direct Lending to Investment Banks for the First Time Ever**
- **Authorized Short-Term Lending to Fannie/Freddie, Backstopping a Treasury Credit Line**



From Hubris to the Humbling of American Capitalism?

*“Government is not the
solution to our problem,
government is the problem.”*

**--Ronald Reagan, from his first
inaugural address, January 20, 1981**



From Hubris to the Humbling of American Capitalism?

“Given the precarious state of today’s financial markets, and their vital importance to the daily lives of the American people, Government intervention is not Only warranted, it is essential.”

--President George W. Bush, Sept. 19, 2008, on the \$700 billion financial institution bailout



Post-Crunch: Fundamental

Issues To Be Examined Globally


- **Failure of Risk Management, Control & Supervision at Financial Institutions Worldwide: Global Impact**
 - Colossal failure of risk management (and regulation)
 - Implications for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)?
 - Misalignment of management financial incentives
- **Focus Will Be on Risk Controls: Implies More Stringent Capital & Liquidity Requirements**
 - Data reporting requirements also likely to be expanded
 - Non-Depository Financial Institutions in for major regulation
 - Changes likely under US and European regulatory regimes
 - Will new regulations be globally consistent?
 - Can overreactions be avoided?
- **Accounting Rules**
 - Problems arose under FAS, IAS
 - Asset Valuation, including Mark-to-Market
 - Structured Finance & Complex Derivatives
- **Ratings on Financial Instruments**
 - New approaches to reflect type of asset, nature of risk



Post-Crunch: Fundamental Regulatory Issues & Insurance

- **Federal Encroachment on Regulation of Insurance**
 - **\$85 billion AIG loan makes increased federal involvement in insurance regulation a certainty**
 - **States will lose some of their regulatory authority**
 - **What Feds get/what states lose is unclear**
- **Removing the “O” from “OFC”?**
 - **Treasury in March proposed moving solvency and consumer protection authority to a federal “Office of National Insurance”**
 - **Moving toward more universal approach for regulation of financial services, perhaps under Fed/Treasury**
 - **Is European (e.g., FSA) approach in store?**
 - **Treasury proposed assuming solvency and consumer protection roles while also eliminating rate regulation**
 - **Expect battle over federal regulatory role to continue to be a divisive issue within the industry**
 - **States will fight to maximize influence, arguing that segments of the financial services industry under their control had the least problems**

Summary of Treasury “Blueprint” for Financial Services Modernization

 **Impacts on Insurers**



Treasury Regulatory

Recommendations Affecting Insurers

- **Establishment of an Optional Federal Charter (OFC)**
 - Would provide system for federal chartering, licensing, regulation and supervision of insurers, reinsurer and producers (agents & brokers)
- **OFC Would Incorporate Several Regulatory Concepts**
 - Ensure safety and soundness
 - Enhance competition in national and international markets
 - Increase efficiency through elimination of price controls, promote more rapid technological change, encourage product innovation, reduce regulatory costs and provide consumer protection
- **Establishment of Office of National Insurance (ONI)**
 - Department within Treasury to regulate insurance pursuant to OFC
 - Headed by Commissioner of National Insurance
 - Commissioner has regulatory, supervisory, enforcement and rehabilitative powers to oversee organization, incorporation, operation, regulation of national insurers and national agencies
- **UPDATE: HR 5840 Introduced April 17 Would Establish Office of Insurance Information (OII)**
 - Would create industry “voice” within Treasury

Government Takeover of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac

Beneficial for Insurers





Treasury's Fannie/Freddie Rescue Package Should Help Residential Property Insurers

THE PROBLEM

- **Fannie Mae/ Freddie Mac borrow huge sums to buy mortgages from mortgage lenders and do so with an implicit government guarantee that should these mortgage sour the government will come to the rescue**
- **Together the entities own or guarantee \$5.4 trillion in mortgages (about 50% of US total)**
- **Collectively Fan/Fred have lost about \$14 billion over the past 4 quarters and their capital is nearly depleted**
- ***Loss of confidence in Fannie/Freddie is primary reason why Fed's slashing of rates since has not lowered interest rates (esp. on mortgages)***



Treasury's Fannie/Freddie Rescue Package Should Help Residential Property Insurers

THE SOLUTION: A 4-POINT PLAN


- 1. Government seizes Fannie Mae/ Freddie Mac and places them in “conservatorship” under their regulator the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)**
 - **Current CEOs ousted. Fannie will be run by Herb Allison (CEO TIAA-CREF) and Freddie by David Moffet (CEO US Bancorp)**
- 2. Treasury purchases senior preferred stock; Govt. gains 79.9% ownership. Could buy up to \$100 billion per firm.**
- 3. Treasury will buy mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the open market issued by Fan/Fred in attempt to lower borrowing costs (\$ unspecified)**
- 4. Treasury establishing new lending facilities for Fan/Fred**

Total federal involvement could amount to \$200 billion



Credit Crisis: Fed Interest Rate Cuts Failed to Reduce Mortgage Rates

January 2000 through August 2008






Why Treasury's Fannie/Freddie Rescue Package Should Help Residential Property Insurers

- **Crash in housing market is already costing home insurers alone about \$1 billion annually in lost premium growth based on 50%+ decline in new home construction (about 1 million fewer homes per year)**
 - **Plan should lower interest rates, accelerate clearing away existing inventory and stimulate new construction (don't expect big gains until 2010 at earliest)**
 - *Mortgage rates fell 1/2 point day after announcement*
- **Home in or headed for foreclosure are likely to suffer worse than average loss experience (neglect, abuse, abandonment, vandalism, theft...). Plan may bring interest rate relief to people who's mortgages will reset over the next several years, averting some foreclosures.**
- **Insurers hold tens of billion in Fan/Fred MBS debt as well as shares in both companies. Both survive.**


THE ECONOMIC STORM

*What a Weakening Economy &
The Threat of Inflation Mean
for the Insurance Industry*





Real Annual GDP Growth, 2000-2009F




* Red bars are actual; Yellow bars are forecasts

Sources: US Department of Commerce (actual), Blue Economic Indicators 8/08 (forecasts).



Real GDP Growth*




*Yellow bars are Estimates/Forecasts from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.

Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators 8/08; Insurance Information Institute.




Unemployment Rate: On the Rise

January 2000 through August 2008





U.S. Unemployment Rate, (2007:Q1 to 2009:Q4F)*




* Blue bars are actual; Yellow bars are forecasts

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (8/08); Insurance Info. Inst.



Total Private Employment* Grew by 25½ Million Workers from 1991 to 2008



*seasonally adjusted at mid-year


Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, at <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost>



Average Weekly Real Earnings in Private Employment Were Flat from 1999 to 2008

(at mid-year)


Constant 1982 dollars





Wage & Salary Disbursements (Payroll Base) vs. Workers Comp Net Written Premiums

Wage & Salary Disbursement (Private Employment) vs. WC NWP




*Average of quarterly figures.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at

<http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WASCUR>; I.I.I. Fact Books



Workplace Injury Incidence Rates Declined in Last 4 Economic Downturns



p Preliminary

Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), National Bureau of Economic Research; NCCI Frequency and Severity Analysis




New Private Housing Starts, 1990-2014F (Millions of Units)

Exposure growth forecast for HO insurers is dim for 2008/09

Impacts also for comml. insurers with construction risk exposure


New home starts plunged 34% from 2005-2007; Drop through 2008 trough is 53% (est.)—a net annual decline of 1.1 million units



I.I.I. estimates that each incremental 100,000 decline in housing starts costs home insurers \$87.5 million in new exposure (gross premium). The net exposure loss in 2008 vs. 2005 is estimated at \$963 million.




Auto/Light Truck Sales, 1999-2014F (Millions of Units)



Source: US Department of Commerce; Blue Chip Economic Indicators for 2008/09, Aug. 2008.
Insurance Information Institute for years 2010-2014.



Nonresidential Fixed Investment,* 2003 – 2009F (Billions of 2000 \$)




*Nonresidential fixed investment consists of structures, equipment and software.

Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Historical), *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* (7/08) for forecasts.



Total Industrial Production, (2007:Q1 to 2009:Q4F)


Industrial production affects exposure both directly and indirectly



Industrial production shrank during Q1 2008 and is expected to shrink again in Q2, growing very slowly thereafter




Percent Change in Debt Growth (Quarterly since 2004:Q1, at Annualized Rate)





Real GDP Growth vs. Real P/C

Premium Growth: Modest Association





Favored Industry Groups for Insurer Exposure Growth

Industry	Rationale
Health Care	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic Necessity → Recession Resistant• Demographics: aging/immigration → Growth
Energy (incl. Alt.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fossil, Solar, Wind, Bio-Fuels, Hydro & Other
Agriculture & Food Processing & Manufacturing	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Consumer Staple → Recession Resistant• Grain and land prices high due to global demand, weak dollar (exports)• Acreage Growing → Farm Equipment, Transport• Benefits many other industries
Export Driven	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Weak dollar, globalization persist
Natural Resources & Commodities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strong global demand,• Supplies remain tight... <i>but beware of bubbles</i>• Significant investments in R&D, plant & equip required



Summary of Economic Risks and Implications for (Re) Insurers


Economic Concern	Risks to Insurers
Subprime Meltdown/ Credit Crunch	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Some</i> insurers have <i>some</i> asset risk• D&O/E&O exposure for <i>some</i> insurers• Client asset management liability for <i>some</i>• Bond insurer problems; Muni credit quality• Mortgage insurers face losses; Also tightening standards and slowing real estate market• Banks less able to lend, slowing construction
Lower Interest Rates	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Lower investment income
Stock Market Slump	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Decreased capital gains (which are usually relied upon more heavily as a source of earnings as underwriting results deteriorate)
General Economic Slowdown/Recession	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reduced commercial lines exposure growth• Surety slump• Decreased workers comp frequency due to drop in high hazard class employment

Inflation Overview

**Pressures Claim Costs,
Expands Probable &
Possible Max Losses**



Annual Inflation Rates (CPI-U, %), 1990-2009F



*12-month change August 2008 vs. August 2007

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators, September 10, 2008. (forecasts)



Inflation: Important Economic Risks and Implications for Insurers

Effects of Inflation	Risks to Insurers & Buyers
Claim Severity Increase	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Claims (property and liability) costs may rise as the price of goods and services increase• PMLs could be (much) higher
Rate Inadequacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Accelerating inflation historically contributed to rate inadequacy because ratemaking is largely a retrospective process• Many types of loss trends are sensitive to the pace of inflation: medical cost, tort, etc.• Historical loss cost trends could be biased predictors of future loss if inflation accelerates




Inflation: Important Economic Risks and Implications for Insurers (cont'd)

Effects of Inflation	Risks to Insurers
Reserve Deficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reserves are established using certain assumptions about future development and discounting factors• If inflation accelerates, development could be more rapid and/or be more substantial (in dollar terms) than assumed and discount factors may be too low
Inadequate Insurance Limits	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Policyholders could find themselves inadequately insured as claims costs escalate
Inadequate Reinsurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inflation can lead to a more rapid and unexpected exhaustion of reinsurance because losses are higher than expected



Comparative 2007 Inflation Statistics Important to Insurers (%)




CPI and “Core” CPI are not representative of many of the costs insurers face

Medical/Legal costs typically run well ahead of inflation

*Core CPI is the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) less food and energy costs.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.

Medical & Tort Cost Inflation


Amplifiers of Inflation, Major
Insurance Cost Driver






Consumer Price Index for Medical Care vs. All Items, 1960-2007

(Base: 1982-84=100)



Tort Cost Growth & Medical Cost Inflation vs. Overall Inflation (CPI-U), 1961-2008*




*Medical cost and CPI-U through April 2008 from BLS. Tort figure is for full-year 2008 from Tillinghast.

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2007 Update on U.S. Tort Costs; Insurance Info. Inst.



WC Medical Severity Rising Far Faster than Medical CPI




Sources: NCCI; Med CPI from Economy.com; WC med severity from NCCI based on NCCI states.



Workers Comp Medical Claims Costs Continue to Climb

Medical
Claim Cost (\$000s)



2007p: Preliminary based on data valued as of 12/31/2007


1991-2006: Based on data through 12/31/2006, developed to ultimate

Based on the states where NCCI provides ratemaking services; Excludes the effects of deductible policies



Med Costs Share of Total Costs is Increasing Steadily

Med cost inflation is one factor to high WC severity. Med cost are now nearly 60% of all lost time claim costs




Source: NCCI (based on states where NCCI provides ratemaking services).



WC Med Cost Will Equal 70% of Total by 2017 if Trends Hold

2017 Estimate



This trend will likely be supported by the increased labor force participation of workers age 55 and older.

PROFITABILITY

**Profits in 2006/07 Reached
Their Cyclical Peak;**


**By No Reasonable Standard Can
Profits Be Deemed Excessive**





P/C Net Income After Taxes

*1991-2008 (\$ Millions)**




*ROE figures are GAAP; 2008 figure is annualized Q1 net income of \$8.234B; ¹Return on avg. surplus.
Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst. ***9.5% excl. mortgage and finl. guarantee insurers.



ROE: P/C vs. All Industries

1987-2008:Q1




2008 P/C insurer figure is annualized Q1 return on average surplus. Excluding mortgage and financial guarantee insurers = 9.5%.

Source: ISO, *Fortune*; Insurance Information Institute.




Profitability Peaks & Troughs in the P/C Insurance Industry, 1975 – 2008:Q1



*GAAP ROE for all years except 2007 which is ROAS of 12.3%. All figures include mortgage and financial guarantee insurers. Excluding M&FG insurers 2008:Q1 ROAS is 9.5%..

Source: Insurance Information Institute, ISO; Fortune

ROE vs. Equity Cost of Capital: US P/C Insurance: 1991-2008:Q1



*Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.
Source: The Geneva Association, Ins. Information Inst.

▲ ROE ■ Cost of Capital



Factors that Will Influence the Length and Depth of the Cycle

- **Capacity**: Rapid surplus growth in recent years has left the industry with between \$85 billion and \$100 billion in excess capital, according to analysts, at end of 2007
 - All else equal, rising capital leads to greater price competition and a liberalization of terms and conditions
- **Reserves**: Reserves are in the best shape (in terms of adequacy) in decades, which could extend the depth and length of the cycle
- **Investment Gains**: With sharp declines in stock prices and falling interest rates, portfolio yields are certain to fall → Contributes to discipline and shallower cycle
- **Sarbanes-Oxley**: Presumably SOX will lead to better and more conservative management of company finances, including rapid recognition of deficient or redundant reserves
 - With more “eyes” on the industry, the theory is that cyclical swings should shrink
- **Ratings Agencies**: Focus on Cycle Management; Quicker to downgrade
- **Information Systems**: Management has more and better tools that allow faster adjustments to price, underwriting and changing market conditions than it had during previous soft markets
- **Analysts/Investors**: Less fixated on growth, more on ROE through soft mkt.
 - Management has backing of investors of Wall Street to remain disciplined
- **M&A Activity**: More consolidation would imply greater discipline




P/C Stocks: Mirroring the S&P 500 Index in 2008

Total YTD Returns Through September 19, 2008

Insurance stocks caught in financial services downdraft, but some p/c insurers up

Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers were down 69% in 2007




*Includes Financial Guarantee.

Source: SNL Securities, Standard & Poor's, Insurance Information Institute.



*Top Industries by ROE: P/C Insurers Still Underperformed in 2007**



**P/C insurer
profitability in 2007
ranked 31st out of 51
industry groups
despite renewed
profitability,
underperforming the
All Industry median
for the 20th
consecutive year**




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- **M&A Activity:** More consolidation would imply greater discipline



Advertising Expenditures by P/C Insurance Industry, 1999-2007E




Source: Insurance Information Institute from consolidated P/C Annual Statement data.

FINANCIAL STRENGTH & RATINGS

**Industry Has Weathered
the Storms Well, But Cycle**




May Takes Its Toll






P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2007

The number of impairments varies significantly over the p/c insurance cycle, with peaks occurring well into hard markets






P/C Insurer Impairment Frequency vs. Combined Ratio, 1969-2007E






Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2005

2003-2005



1969-2005




*Includes overstatement of assets.



Cumulative Average Impairment Rates by Best Financial Strength Rating*


Insurers with strong ratings are far less likely to become impaired over long periods of time. Especially important in long-tailed lines.



*US P/C and L/H companies, 1977-2002

Sources: A.M. Best: *Best's Impairment Rate and Rating Transition Study—1977-2002*, March 1, 2004.


*Top 10 P/C Insolvencies, Based Upon Guaranty Fund Payments**



* Disclaimer: This is not a complete picture. If anything the numbers are understated as some states have not reported in certain years.

Source: National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds, as of September 17, 2008.

Top 10 Life Insolvencies, Based On Guaranty Fund Payments and Net Estimated Costs*




*As of 2007.

Source: National Organization of Life and Health Guaranty Funds


UNDERWRITING TRENDS

**Extremely Strong 2006/07;
Relying on Momentum &
Discipline for 2008**






*P/C Insurance Combined Ratio, 1970-2008F**



Sources: A.M. Best; ISO, III *Full year 2008 estimates from III.



P/C Insurance Industry Combined Ratio, 2001-2008:Q1




*Excluding Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers.

Sources: A.M. Best, ISO; III.




Ten Lowest P/C Insurance Combined Ratios Since 1920 vs. 2007






Underwriting Gain (Loss)

1975-2008:Q1*






Impact of Reserve Changes on Combined Ratio





Cumulative Prior Year Reserve Development by Line (As of 12/31/06)



COMMERCIAL LINES

Commercial Auto

Commercial Multi-Peril



Workers Comp






Commercial Lines Combined Ratio, 1993-2008F

Commercial coverages have exhibited significant variability over time.


Outside CAT-affected lines, commercial insurance is doing fairly well. Caution is required in underwriting long-tail commercial lines.




Recent results benefited from favorable loss cost trends, improved tort environment, low CAT losses, WC reforms and reserve releases

EXCESS & SURPLUS LINES

*Growth, Performance
& Markets*




Direct Surplus Lines Premiums Written (Non-Admitted, Top 10 Writers)



Source: *Business Insurance*, Sept. 8, 2008; Insurance Information Institute.




Surplus Lines Taxes Collected





Top 10 E&S Insurers by Non-Admitted 2007 Direct Premiums Written




**The Top 10 E&S
insurers wrote \$13.6
billion in premiums in
2007, down 10.2%
from 2006 but up
22.5% from 2002**



Top 10 E&S Markets, by First Half 2008 Gross Surplus Lines Premiums Written

\$ Millions




California and Florida are by far the largest markets



Top 10 States With Fastest Growing E&S Markets, 2003-2005

% Change in Gross Premiums Written: 2003-2005




Fastest growth is not usually in most CAT-prone states as might be expected



Top 10 States With Fastest Growing E&S Markets, 2005-2007

% Change in Gross Premiums Written: 2005-2007




Fastest growth is often, but not always, in most CAT-prone states



Most Common Classes of E&S Business Written, 2005

Percentage of Most Common Types Offered




Source: *Business Insurance*, Sept. 11, 2006; Insurance Information Institute.



Most Common Classes of E&S Business Written, 2007


Percentage of Most Common Types Offered



Source: *Business Insurance*, Sept. 8 2008; Insurance Information Institute.

EMERGING RISKS

*Common Mistake is to
Assume all Emerging Risks
are About Underwriting*






Emerging Risks Impacting the Global (Re)Insurance Industry

Issue	Issue
Erosion of Tort Reform	Inflation Risk
Bad Faith Litigation	Employment Practices Liability
Post-Catastrophe Litigation	Energy Sector
Climate Change (liability>property)	Nursing Home/Asst. Living
Products Liability (Imports, Food)	Currency Risk
Regulatory Risk	Economic Shock/Contagion Effects
Securities Litigation	Terrorism
Asset Valuation Risk (Mark-to-Market)	Nanotechnology
Environmental Liability	Pharmaceuticals
Latent Occupational Disease	Disintermediation
Socialization of Insurance Markets	US Tax Policy

PREMIUM GROWTH

**At a Virtual Standstill
in 2007/08**




Strength of Recent Hard Markets by NWP Growth



1975-78

1984-87

2000-03




2008 is Q1 actual (-0.7%), including Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers

Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute




Year-to-Year Change in Net Written Premium, 2000-Q1:2008



Source: A.M. Best; ISO.




Personal/Commercial Lines & Reinsurance NPW Growth, 2006-2008F






Commercial P/C Distribution Channels, Direct vs. Independent Agents



PRICING TRENDS




Under Pressure





Cost of Risk vs. Commercial Lines Combined Ratio




How the Risk Dollar is Spent (2006)

Total liability costs account for 35% - 40% of the risk dollar


Firms w/Revenues < \$1 Billion

Firms w/Revenues > \$1 Billion






Average Commercial Rate Change, All Lines, (1Q:2004 – 2Q:2008)






Cumulative Commercial Rate Change by Line: 4Q99 – 2Q08






Average Commercial Rate Change by Account Size: 4Q99 – 2Q08






Average Commercial Rate Change by Line: 4Q99 – 2Q08






Most Layers of Coverage are Being Challenged/Leaking






U.S. Domiciled Captives- Net Premiums Written (\$ Millions)





Risk Retention Group Premiums, 1988 – 2006*

Millions of Dollars




*2006 Projected

Source: Risk Retention Reporter, Insurance Info. Institute


RISING EXPENSES

*Expense Ratios Will Rise as
Premium Growth Slows*





Personal vs. Commercial Lines Underwriting Expense Ratio*




*Ratio of expenses incurred to net premiums written.

Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute


CAPACITY/ SURPLUS

**Accumulation of Capital/
Surplus Depresses ROEs**






U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2008:Q1*





Annual Catastrophe Bond Transactions Volume, 1997-2007

■ Risk Capital Issued ◆ Number of Issuances





P/C Insurer Share Repurchases, 1987- Through Q4 2007 (\$ Millions)

Reasons Behind Capital Build-Up & Repurchase Surge


- Strong underwriting results
- Moderate catastrophe losses
 - Reasonable investment performance
- Lack of strategic alternatives (M&A, large-scale expansion)

Returning capital owners (shareholders) is one of the few options available

2007 share buybacks shattered the 2006 record, up 214%

2007 repurchases to date equate to 3.9% of industry surplus, the highest in 20 years

\$22,322.6




MERGER & ACQUISITION

Are Catalysts for P/C
Consolidation Growing
in 2008?





*P/C Insurer M&A Activity, ** *1997-2008***






Distribution of P/C Insurer

Acquisitions, Jan. 2007 – June 2008

Deals Exceeding \$100 Million

SUMMARY STATS

- 22 deals
- \$23 billion total transaction value
- \$475 million median deal value
- Acquirers mostly p/c insurers and limited number of private equity deals






Motivating Factors for Increased P/C Insurer Consolidation

Motivating Factors for P/C M&As

- **Slow Growth**: Growth is at its lowest levels since the late 1990s
 - NWP growth was 0% in 2007; Appears similarly flat in 2008
 - Prices are falling or flat in most non-coastal markets
- **Accumulation of Capital**: Excess capital depresses ROEs
 - Policyholder Surplus up 6-7% in 2007 and up 80% since 2002
 - Insurers hard pressed to maintain earnings momentum
 - Options: Share Buybacks, Boost Dividends, Invest in Operation, Acquire
 - Option B: Engage in destructive price war and destroy capital
- **Reserve Adequacy**: No longer a drag on earnings
 - Favorable development in recent years offsets pre-2002 adverse develop.
- **Favorable Fundamentals/Drop-Off in CAT Activity**
 - Underlying claims inflation (frequency and severity trends) are benign
 - Lower CAT activity took some pressure of capital base



Distribution Sector: Insurance-Related M&A Activity, 1988-2006



Source: Conning Research & Consulting.




Distribution Sector M&A

Activity, 2005 vs. 2006


2005

2006




INVESTMENT OVERVIEW

*More Pain,
Little Gain*





Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment Gain¹




¹Investment gains consist primarily of interest, stock dividends and realized capital gains and losses. 2006 figure consists of \$52.3B net investment income and \$3.4B realized investment gain.

*2005 figure includes special one-time dividend of \$3.2B.

Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.



P/C Insurer Net Realized Capital Gains, 1990-2008:Q1






Total Returns for Large Company Stocks: 1970-2008*

S&P 500 was up 3.53% in 2007, but down 14.5% so far in 2008*



P/C Investment Income as a % of Invested Assets Follows 10-Year US T-Note

▲ P-C Inv Income/Inv Assets ■ 10-Year Treasury Note



*As of July 2008.

Sources: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System; A.M.Best; Insurance Information Institute.


CATASTROPHIC LOSS

**This is (One Reason)
Why You Buy
Reinsurance**






Most of US Population & Property Has Major CAT Exposure



*Is
Anyplace
Safe?*



U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses*



*Excludes \$4B-\$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita.


**Based on preliminary PCS data through June 30. PCS \$1.8B loss of for Gustav. \$9.8B for Ike of 9/22.

Note: 2001 figure includes \$20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = \$12.2B.

Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute



Top 12 Most Costly Hurricanes in US History, (Insured Losses, \$2007)




*Based on average of midpoints of range estimates from risk modelers AIR, RMS and Egecat as of 9/15/08. Sources: ISO/PCS; AIR Worldwide, RMS, Egecat; Insurance Information Institute inflation adjustments.




Hurricane Ike Initial Insured Loss Estimates

(Billions of \$, as of September 19, 2008)





Natural Disasters in the United States, 1980-2008 (Jan – June Totals)



Geophysical
(earthquake, tsunami,
volcanic activity)

Meteorological (storm)

Hydrological
(flood, mass movement)


Climatological
(temperature extremes,
drought, wildfire)



Global Insured Catastrophe Losses 1970-2007 (\$ 2007)

\$ Billions


**Impact of Hurricane Katrina
on 2005 losses was dramatic,
but losses are trending
upward in general**





Insured Offshore Energy Losses for Recent Major Gulf Storms


Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Ivan cost energy insurers at least \$7 billion. Gustav estimates range from \$1B - \$3B.



*Midpoint of RMS estimated range of \$1.0 to \$3.0 billion as of 9/1/08; **Midpoint of range of \$2.0 to \$2.5 billion)
Sources: Insurance Information Institute research estimates.




Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure (2004, \$ Billions)





Total Value of Insured Coastal Exposure (2007, \$ Billions)



The 2008 Hurricane Season:

Preview to Disaster?





Outlook for 2008 Hurricane

Season: 90% Worse Than Average

	Average*	2005	2008F
Named Storms	9.6	28	17
Named Storm Days	49.1	115.5	90
Hurricanes	5.9	14	9
Hurricane Days	24.5	47.5	45
Intense Hurricanes	2.3	7	5
Intense Hurricane Days	5	7	11
Accumulated Cyclone Energy	96.2	NA	175
Net Tropical Cyclone Activity	100%	275%	190%

*Average over the period 1950-2000.

Source: Dr. Philip Klotzbach and Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, August 5, 2008.



Landfall Probabilities for 2008 Hurricane Season: Above Average


	Average*	2008F
Entire US East & Gulf Coasts	52%	67%
US East Coast Including Florida Peninsula	31%	43%
Gulf Coast from Florida Panhandle to Brownsville	30%	42%
Caribbean	NA	Above Average

*Average over the past century.

Source: Dr. Philip Klotzbach and Dr. William Gray, Colorado State University, August 5, 2008.


REINSURANCE MARKETS

*Reinsurance Prices are
Falling in Non-Coastal
Zones, Casualty Lines*





Share of Losses Paid by Reinsurers, by Disaster*



Reinsurance is playing an increasingly important role in the financing of mega-CATs; Reins. Costs are skyrocketing


*Excludes losses paid by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, a FL-only windstorm reinsurer, which was established in 1994 *after* Hurricane Andrew. FHCF payments to insurers are estimated at \$3.85 billion for 2004 and \$4.5 billion for 2005.

Sources: Wharton Risk Center, Disaster Insurance Project; Insurance Information Institute.



US Reinsurer Net Income & ROE, 1985-2007*

Reinsurer profitability rebounded post-Katrina but is now falling



Source: Reinsurance Association of America. *2007 ROE figure is III estimate based return on average 2007 surplus.





Regional Distribution of Reinsurers by NWP, 2006

Eight countries account for 89 percent of global reinsurance volume.

International reinsurers from Germany, Switzerland and France account for 40 percent of global reinsurance volume.


Bermuda is a growing market, with a 10 percent share. Lloyd's and London-based reinsurers account for 6 percent of the world market.






Reinsurer Market Share Comparison: 1990 vs. 2006

1990




2006



U.S. Reinsurer market share fell precipitously between 1990 and 2006

Shifting Legal Liability & Tort Environment

*Is the Tort Pendulum
Swinging Against Insurers?*





*Bad Year for Tort Kingpins**

“King of Class Actions” Bill Lerach

- Former partner in class action firm Milberg Weiss
- Admitted felon. Guilty of paying 3 plaintiffs \$11.4 million in 150+ cases over 25 years & lying about it repeatedly to courts
- Will serves 1-2 years in prison and forfeit \$7.75 million; \$250,000 fine

“King of Torts” Dickie Scruggs

- Won billions in tobacco, asbestos and Katrina litigation
- Pleaded guilty for attempting to offer a judge \$40,000 bribe to resolve attorney fee allocation from Katrina litigation in his firm’s favor. His son/others → guilty on related charges
- Could get 5 years in prison, \$250,000 fine



*Bad Year for Tort Kingpins** *(Continued)*




“King of Class Actions” Melvyn Weiss

- **Former partner in class action firm Milberg Weiss; Earned \$251 million in legal fees**
- **Pled guilty to federal charges of racketeering and conspiracy for paying kickbacks to professional plaintiffs**
- **Sentenced to 30 months in prison, pay \$9.75 million in restitution; \$250,000 fine**



Personal, Commercial & Self (Un) Insured Tort Costs*




*Excludes medical malpractice

Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2007 Update on US Tort Cost Trends.



Growth in Cost of U.S. Tort System, 1951-2009F

Tort costs moderated beginning in 2003 as many improvements in the tort system began to bear fruit






Cost of US Tort System (\$ Billions)

Tort costs consumed 1.87% of GDP in 2006, down from 2.24% in 2003


Per capita “tort tax” was \$825 in 2006, up from \$680 in 2000




Reducing tort costs relative to GDP by just 0.25% (to 1.84%) would produce an economic stimulus of \$31.1B



Tort System Costs, 1950-2009E




Tort System Costs and Tort Costs as a Share of GDP, 2000-2009F



Liability: Average Cost per \$1,000 of Revenue*

United States, 2001 to 2007



*Across entire liability program (full population)

Source: Marsh, 2007 Limits of Liability Report



The Nation's Judicial Hellholes (2007)

Watch List

Madison County, IL

St. Clair County, IL

Northern New Mexico

Hillsborough County, FL

Delaware

California

Dishonorable Mentions

District of Columbia


MO Supreme Court

MI Legislature

GA Supreme Court

Oklahoma

Some improvement
in "Judicial
Hellholes" in 2007





Business Leaders Ranking of Liability Systems for 2007

Best States

1. Delaware
2. Minnesota
3. Nebraska
4. Iowa
5. Maine
6. New Hampshire
7. Tennessee
8. Indiana
9. Utah
10. Wisconsin

New in 2007

*ME, NH, TN,
UT, WI*

Drop-Offs

*ND, VA, SD,
WY, ID*

*Midwest/West
has mix of good
and bad states*

Worst States

41. Arkansas
42. Hawaii
43. Alaska
44. Texas
45. California
46. Illinois
47. Alabama
48. Louisiana
49. Mississippi
50. West Virginia

Newly Notorious


AK

*Rising
Above*

FL




Sum of Top 10 Jury Awards, 2004-2007





Number of Top 10 Jury Awards, 1995 - 2007






Total Top 10 Verdicts, 1995 through 2006

Top Ten verdicts since 1995

Texas, New York and California continue to lead nation





2007 Top Ten Verdicts

Value	Issue	State
\$109 Million	Medical Malpractice	New York
\$102.7 Million	Premises Liability, Death	Florida
\$55.2 Million	Product Liability, Death	California
\$54 Million	Private Air Crash	Florida
\$54 Million	Nursing Home, Death	New Mexico
\$50 Million	DUI Crash	Florida
\$50 Million	Product Liability, Death	Alabama
\$47.6 Million	Prempro	Nevada
\$47.5 Million	Vioxx	New Jersey
\$45 Million	Auto Crash, Death	Florida


Source: LawyersWeekly USA, January 22, 2008.

REGULATORY & LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT

Isolated Improvements,




Mounting Zealoutry



Rating of Auto/Home Insurance Regulatory & Operating Environment*

Most states (25) get a “B”, but 7 got A’s, 10 got C’s (including DC), 5 earned D’s and 4 got F’s



*Criteria considered were auto/home residual mkt.s., auto/home mkt. concentration, loss ratio stability, reg. env.,form regulation, credit scores, territorial restrictions

Source: James Madison Institute, Feb. 2008



Insurance Information Institute On-Line

WWW.III.ORG

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